Okay... Hollywood Lies are defined, and we're ready (God willing) for part II of the "How on earth does a Christian form his/her conscience properly?"
Start with the most basic of moral principles:
Moral Law #1: The end (i.e. goal) of an action never justifies evil means.
In practical terms, this means that no one is ever morally allowed to intend an evil act (or outcome), no matter what the potential "payoff" might be. If I could save a billion people from agonizing deaths by the murder of a single innocent child, it would be morally wrong for me to do that. If I could save a billion people from agonizing deaths by the euthanasia of an Alzheimer's patient who was to die in 6 months anyway... it would be morally wrong for me to do that. NO ONE can intend an evil act, even if the potential "payoff" is mind-numbingly "good". Evil is evil, and it must not be chosen. To say otherwise is to say to God, "You designed and You run the universe so badly that I need to break Your Laws in order to do Your Will (i.e. what is good)!" A few moments' reflection will show how absurd that idea is.
Note: make every effort to keep in mind the proper place of emotions; they are good things, created by God, but they were never designed to replace your intellect (the power by which you "know" things), or your free will (the power by which you "choose" things). Just as Faith, Hope and Charity ultimately reside in the Will, so do sins reside in the will. For example: "feeling" angry is not a sin; but the free *choice* to *nurture* that anger (i.e. hold a grudge, or inflame your anger into unjust wrath) is a sin.
I mention this, because one of the most common (and fierce) objections to these principles is the cry, "I couldn't possibly bear to do (or not to do) [x, y, or z]!" That's your heart, taking... you know, the thing that's "deceitful above all things"? Don't trust it to run your life. The heart needs to be directed by the will, which needs to be informed by the intellect; that may seem "cold and unfeeling" (it isn't!), but that's how not to fall into moral evil. Too many "heart-led" people have "followed their foolish hearts" and killed their unborn children, or murdered their disabled and/or elderly relatives/friends, or violated and betrayed their marriages in order to "follow their hearts" to "new soul-mates". In short: the heart is good; but it's not a good driver.
Moral Law #2: If an action has multiple effects--both good and evil--the evil effects are not sinful to the extent that they are not willed.
This is often called the "principle of double-effect". If you intend an action to cause [good outcome x], but it also causes [evil outcome y], the action is not necessarily sinful for you, provided that it satisfies four basic conditions:
1) the intended action is good, or at least morally neutral
2) the evil effect is not intended
3) the good effect is not caused by the evil effect
4) there is sufficiently grave reason for permitting the evil effect
(See HERE for details, on this.)
So... let's try a few examples, to flesh out this principle. (In the below, when I say "lawful", I mean morally lawful; civil law is irrelevant, to the extent that it violates the moral law, anyway.)
Situation #1: Is it lawful to kill an embryonic human baby (for the purpose of "harvesting" his/her embryonic stem cells), so that potential (or even guaranteed) cures for others may result--even to the extent of saving lives?
Answer: NO. The saving of lives is certainly a good intention; but no matter how many lives are saved (i.e no matter what the "potential or actual payoff"), it is never lawful to intend the death of any other person (see condition #1). Even if every last human on earth were threatened with death from agonizing disease, and if only one embryonic child's death were necessary to save all of humanity from terrible suffering and death, it would still be immoral.
Situation #2: Is it lawful to kill an unborn baby by abortion, if he/she was conceived through rape or incest?
Answer: NO. Even if the intended effect were "relief of the mother from alleged psychological distress" (which is a false hope, anyway), it is never lawful to intend the death of any other person (see condition #1), and no appeals to emotion will avail against this truth.
In my next section, I'll try to tackle the thornier issue of "to what extent can someone vote for abortion-tolerant [or tolerant of other intrinsic evils] politicians?"... which is one of the main reasons I started this 3-part series in the first place! To be continued...
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6 comments:
Ori: Is inaction morally equivalent to action? For example, is there a moral difference between killing a baby, and neglecting to feed the baby?
Paladin: Even if every last human on earth were threatened with death from agonizing disease, and if only one embryonic child's death were necessary to save all of humanity from terrible suffering and death, it would still be immoral.
Ori: What if one of the people being saved was the mother, so that our options were to kill the baby, or do nothing and have both mother and baby die?
I know what I would do, but that's because as a Jew I don't accept your Moral Law #2. According to the Talmud consequences that are known and unavoidable are not morally different from those that are intended.
Hi, Ori,
(I'm writing from my mother-in-law's house, so I haven't much time; I'll try to update this next week, in more detail.)
To your first question: an omission is sinful if it was incumbent upon you to act (to enact a good for which you were morally responsible [e.g. feeding your children], but you freely chose not to do so. To the extent that an unlawful omission was knowingly and freely chosen, it is sinful.
To your second question (re: the mother and child--I assume you mean something like an ectopic pregnancy in a fallopian tube?): it depends entirely upon your intent. If you remove the section of fallopian tube that's threatening to hemorrhage--and, in doing so, remove the child even if he/she cannot yet survive on its own--that is lawful, but only if you're morally certain that inaction will result in the death of the mother (and, consequently, the child). The four conditions for lawful invocation of "double-effect" are present:
1) The intended action (saving the mother's life) is good.
2) The evil effect (the death of the baby) is not intended; you'd save the child's life, if you could.
3) The good effect is not caused by the evil effect; at the risk of sounding like I'm splitting hairs: the mother's life is not preserved *because* of the baby's *death*, but because the baby is no longer growing in a part of her body which cannot handle that growth. If, hypothetically, an "artificial womb" could receive that unborn child at this critical point, the mother's life would still be saved, despite the "lack of death" of the baby.
(If you need an example of where the evil effect *causes* the good outcome, think of a family whose father is in a hospital with a disease that's expensive to treat, and whose mother needs a certain expensive operation to cure her own illness; she would NOT be morally allowed to murder her husband secretly, in order to get insurance money to cover the cost of her own operation... since the evil effect (the death of the husband) was the direct cause of the good effect (the reception of the insurance money--provided that she murdered her husband in a way that couldn't be detected or proven).
4) The avoidance of the mother's assumably certain death is certainly grave enough reason to enact such a course of action... whereas a mere avoidance of pain and suffering (or any lesser reason) would *not* be grave enough to enact a course of action which would (beyond anyone's intention) result in the child's death.
This, by the way, is the reason why one would have to refuse if a doctor came up to you and said, "Hey, we have a new laser surgery that can remove the fetus and keep the fallopian tube intact! That way, you can try to get pregnant again!" That's a deliberate "targeting" of the child--which is clear-cut murder.
as a Jew I don't accept your Moral Law #2. According to the Talmud consequences that are known and unavoidable are not morally different from those that are intended.
I'm not quite sure what to say to that, save that Catholic teaching directly contradicts the principle you describe; and the Catholic and Talmudic principles cannot both be true. I will say, though, that your portrayal would probably yield some circumstances in which a man or woman could not possibly avoid sinning! Act with knowledge of evil consequences, and sin; withhold action with knowledge of evil consequences, and sin *that* way. I, for one, deny that our God could possibly be that capricious, as to place humans in a position where violating His Will is inevitable; since sin is the unjust violation of God's Will, how could that be, if God "hemmed you in" and made it impossible to avoid? Something's not right with that picture...
I'm not quite sure what to say to that, save that Catholic teaching directly contradicts the principle you describe; and the Catholic and Talmudic principles cannot both be true.
Of course, we have contradictions that cannot be reconciled. The best we can do is come up with mutually acceptable laws that let us live together - and pray that God forgives our neighbors for being wrong (I pray that God forgive me if I am wrong - but I'm not Orthodox).
I will say, though, that your portrayal would probably yield some circumstances in which a man or woman could not possibly avoid sinning!
The Jewish answer is that in such a case a normally forbidden action is not a sin. For example, it is a sin to work hard and move rocks on Yom Kippur - but if are clearing rubble that may hide a living person, it's a Mitzvah. You have to do it.
What about you? IIRC, if you were in a state of grace (as best you can determine) and went to mass on Sunday, it would be sinful for you not to take communion. What about a Catholic who was gluten and alcohol intolerant? Wouldn't the course that would normally be sinful (refraining from communion) become licit, and even required, in such a case?
Hi, Ori!
You wrote:
[Brian]I will say, though, that your portrayal would probably yield some circumstances in which a man or woman could not possibly avoid sinning!
[Ori]
The Jewish answer is that in such a case a normally forbidden action is not a sin. For example, it is a sin to work hard and move rocks on Yom Kippur - but if are clearing rubble that may hide a living person, it's a Mitzvah. You have to do it.
Hm. That's not so far removed from Catholic doctrine; the Church recognizes that there are certain actions (or omissions) which are relatively evil--i.e. evil, given a certain set of circumstances, as opposed to that which is "intrinsically" evil, or evil regardless of circumstances (which no one can ever do intentionally, regardless of circumstances). Example: under ordinary circumstances, I am forbidden to enter the tabernacle and take the Holy Eucharist--at least, not without extraordinary permission; but if the Eucharist is in danger of being profaned, I can not only take the Holy Eucharist, but I may consume Him [i.e. self-communicate]... since the circumstances themselves "give" me the special permission needed to do so without sin (all other things being equal).
Perhaps this will help: the Churh teaches, as an ironclad principle, that God never requires the impossible, nor will He indict us for committing an evil act that we did not knowingly and freely choose. There's no such thing as "sinning by accident" or "sinning against your will", as such.
What about you? IIRC, if you were in a state of grace (as best you can determine) and went to mass on Sunday, it would be sinful for you not to take communion.
You might be thinking of the obligation to assist (i.e. attend and participate) at Holy Mass on all Sundays and Holy Days of Obligation; but the only "positive" obligation re: the frequency of reception of Holy Communion is that we receive at least once per year, during the Easter season.
What about a Catholic who was gluten and alcohol intolerant? Wouldn't the course that would normally be sinful (refraining from communion) become licit, and even required, in such a case?
I suppose, to preserve your example, we could picture a *priest* in that position, who'd developed these allergies after he was ordained (since such intolerances would probably have disqualified him as a candidate for the priesthood, beforehand), since he would be required to receive under both forms (the forms of bread and wine) at every Mass he celebrates. In such a case, the priest might be forced to appeal to the Pope for a dispensation from his obligation to offer the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass altogether. (I've no idea whether that would involve full-fledged "laicization"--removal from the clerical state--or not.) But the reception of Holy Communion by that priest would not be sinful, since the damage suffered by his body (from allergic reactions) is an unintended secondary effect; the primary goal was to satisfy his obligations under Church law, etc. (See the 4 conditions, in the main post.)
More later--must dash!
In Christ,
Brian
Hi, Ori,
I've had a while to ponder your comments (in-between visiting with my wife's family--I'm stil at their house), and I'm still somewhat unclear about the Talmudic response to "double-effect". You wrote:
According to the Talmud consequences that are known and unavoidable are not morally different from those that are intended.
...but then you wrote, in the case of the apparent "sin if you do, sin if you don't" scenario:
The Jewish answer is that in such a case a normally forbidden action is not a sin. For example, it is a sin to work hard and move rocks on Yom Kippur - but if are clearing rubble that may hide a living person, it's a Mitzvah. You have to do it.
How do these two square with each other? In the case of rescuing the rubble-buried living victim on Yom Kippur, aren't the consequences (i.e. violating the prohibition against work) known and unavoidable, and therefore morally equivalent to an *intentional* violation of the "no-work" precept, as per the Talmud?
I still do wonder if the Talmudic approach and the Church's teachings aren't very much the same principle, cast in different words and emphases. If I understood your second comment correctly, it's the case that something which would *normally* be sinful is--because of extraordinary circumstances--rendered non-sinful, and not simply "sinful, but somehow still obligatory" (i.e. the bizarre hypothetical of God "requiring someone to sin"). Is that right? I ask, because the "rubble-trapped living person" rescue would be seen as morally permissible under the principle of double-effect, even if it fell on a Sunday (the Christian day of Sabbath rest--which is still binding on all Catholics [and possibly all Christians], regardless of the fact that many Catholics are ignorant of the fact), for teh following reasons:
a) the rescue attempt is a good action.
b) the evil effect (of breaking the mandatory rest) is not intended, but is an undesired and unintended side-effect.
c) the rescue of the victim is not directly caused by the violation of the mandatory rest, per se; it was caused by the act of moving rubble--which is not intrinsically evil, and would otherwise be permitted even in non-emergency situations.
d) the motive--saving the life of a person--is sufficiently grave to justify the endurance of the evil effect.
If you'd said (like many secular humanists would have done), "Yeah, the Talmud says I'd be sinning either way... but I figured I'd follow my heart and sin in a way that does the most good!", then I'd say, "Top marks for intention, but you're talking logical nonsense, ethically speaking!" But you don't: you say that the Law makes specific provision for a "clash of mandates", by which one is not morally required to attempt the impossible. That seems not only sensible, but self-consistent.
In short: maybe the apparent contradiction between the Talmudic approach isn't really an essential contradiction, but rather a misunderstanding between us re: the details of application?
In Christ,
Brian
Ori: In Judaism it's not a matter of double effect, but of a hierarchy of Mitzvot (= commandments), with the more important ones superseding the less important ones.
If you will to move the rocks, then you will to work on Yom Kippur. Judaism does not let you get away with saying that that's an unintended consequence. Instead, we say that the prohibition to work on Yom Kippur is overriden by the need to save somebody's life.
In many cases the Catholic doctrine of double effect and the Jewish doctrine of one Mitzvah overriding another come up to the same result in practice. But there are cases when they do not.
Brian: c) the rescue of the victim is not directly caused by the violation of the mandatory rest, per se; it was caused by the act of moving rubble--which is not intrinsically evil, and would otherwise be permitted even in non-emergency situations.
Ori: In Judaism point c is not required. The cause of the good can be directly something that is normally a sin. For example, take an ectopic pregnancy. At today's level of medical knowledge, we have three options:
1. Do nothing, resulting in dead mother and dead fetus.
2. Cut the fallopian tube, resulting in a less fertile mother and a dead fetus.
3. Abort the fetus, resulting in an equally fertile mother and a dead fetus.
A Jewish doctor would choose #3. The survival of the mother (the good effect) would result directly from the killing of the fetus (the evil effect). This wouldn't be considered sinful, because none of these scenarios result in the fetus being alive. I assume that a Catholic doctor would be bound to choose #2, so that the survival of the mother will not be caused directly by the killing of the fetus.
I think that another example is forbidden foods. If a Jew is medically required to eat pork, then Halacha (= Jewish version of cannon law) requires that Jew to eat pork. Back when Catholics were required to refrain from meat in lent, what would have been the rule for a Catholic under doctor's orders to eat meat?
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