On many occasions (usually in debates with atheists), I've been in the position of trying to demonstrate the existence of God, independent of Scripture, Sacred Tradition, Church Teaching, emotion, or personal experience. It's something of a chore (despite the fact that something about proofs appeals to the "inner geek" in me!), but I've assembled--or rather, cobbled together--my own meager attempt at such a proof. I don't pretend that it's airtight, or even very good; in fact, I ask all readers to do their best to tear it down, find flaws, discover fallacies, expose gaping holes, and the like! (Then I'll rebuild it accordingly, and I don't have to pay an editor! :) )
If you read past this point, all legal disclaimers regarding your mental health are in full force!
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Notice: the following is for entertainment purposes only. The author assumes no extraordinary liability toward the reader for mental injury or facial injuries due to boredom-induced collapse into computer keyboards, nor can the author be held accountable for any program of hair-replacement therapy necessitated by the frustrated removal of the original follicles by the reader. Besides, the author doesn't have any money to pay a lawsuit; so there.
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The Necessary Existence of God?
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Definition A: By "cause", this argument will mean "ontological cause", or "that which is responsible for bringing an object into existence," or "that which bestows existence to another object." (It's true that Aristotle, Aquinas, etc., suggested many types of causes; I'll be abstracting from and/or conflating them, in general. Time will tell if such a move is well-advised.)
Definition B: By "object", this argument will mean anything which in any way holds ontological existence.
Definition C: By "eternal", this argument will mean that which is completely independent of time.
Definition D: By "intrinsic [essential] existence", this argument will describe that which exists by necessity, and by its very nature; that which is causeless.
Definition E: By "extrinsic [essential] existence", this argument will describe that which is dependent upon an ontological cause for its existence; that which does not exist by necessity.
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Assumptions (assumed to be self-evident):
Lemma #1: An object must exist in order to act.
Lemma #2: An object cannot use or extend that which it does not possess (corollary to Lemma #1).
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Proposition #1: No object can be its own cause.
Proof: There are only two possibilities for any object, re: causation: an object is either caused, or uncaused.
a) If an object is uncaused, then Prop. #1 is trivially true.
b) If an object is caused, then its cause must (by Lemma #1) have existed in order to enact that causation. It is therefore manifestly true that a non-existent object cannot act to bring itself (or anything else) into existence.
Proposition #2: Causation is necessarily bound to the definition of "change."
Proof: Any change is an event by which an object either loses or gains characteristics--by which an object (in one or more ways) moves from potentiality to actuality, or from actuality to potentiality. (It will be necessary, before finishing the proof, to discuss the mode of continued existence of any given object.) Since "cause" (as per definition #1) denotes an event by which an object gains ontological existence, the definition of "change" is thus satisfied. (Discussions of change regarding "loss" will be described below.)
An object's existence can be conceived as being either (a) intrinsic, by its very nature (i.e. uncaused); or (b) extrinsic (i.e. caused and maintained). It might be argued that an object could, hypothetically, be "caused, but independent (i.e. not maintained)" in the sense that it required an "initial cause", but needs no "maintenance" of that acquired existence; such a suggestion stems from a misunderstanding of--among other things--the nature of time, in that an object's existence at any given moment subsequent to its causation is dependent on its existence in prior moments (up to that moment of causation--which is then dependent on the extrinsic cause), just as surely as the existence of a 100m object is dependent upon the existence of, say, the first 99m. Such a suggestion, therefore, cannot be maintained.
Objection #1: Cannot an object have discontinuous existence? Cannot an object exist for a burst of moments, blink out of existence, and then re-appear, for an indefinite number of repetitions?
Reply #1: Even if that were possible, it would merely push the case back to smaller intervals; the very same propositions would hold for each small "segment" of existence, and each "annihilation" would require its own cause, as would any subsequent "recreation". If an object has intrinsic existence, then (by definition) it will never cease; if an object has extrinsic existence, then it is dependent on an extrinsic cause for that existence. No object can "cycle" between existence and nonexistence by its intrinsic nature--if for no other reason than the fact that any object which ceases to exist (a) is shown to have non-intrinsic existence, and (b) would be helpless to enact its own "recreation" (cf. Lemma #1).
There are only two ways by which characteristics can be lost: by active negation (i.e. an event, force, etc., which actively cancels an existing characteristic), or by privation (i.e. by having the "maintaining source" discontinue its maintenance). Both cases require an extrinsic cause.
Similarly, there is only one way by which attributes can be gained: by extrinsic cause (since an object cannot bestow upon itself that which it does not itself possess, as per Lemma #2).
As such, any change must necessarily require a cause or causes (since change, by definition, requires the gain and/or loss of attributes--and both require extrinsic causes). Conversely, any cause (so-called) would necessitate the existence of change--at least insofar as the object being "caused" is concerned (which changes in state from potential to actual--from nonexistence to existence).
Objection #2: "There seem to be many types of change which do not require gain or loss; what is gained or lost, for example, by an object moving from position A to position B?"
Reply #2: Such an object would lose its characteristic of occupying position A (to say nothing of a possible loss of being at relative rest), and it would gain the characteristic of occupying position B (to say nothing of having gained--albeit briefly--the positions of all intermediate locations, and having lost the state of potentiality inherent in *not* moving). No change can possibly occur without gain or loss. (It should be noted that the subjective ideas of "degradation" and "improvement" have nothing especially to do with the strict definitions of "gain" (moving from potential to actual) or "loss" (moving from actual to potential); it is not the purpose of this specific proposition to explore advancement toward, or retreat from, any sort of perfection.)
Proposition #3: Given any example of change(s), one must consequently posit one or more causes.
Proof: see Proposition #2. I assert that the visible universe does, in fact, offer many such examples of change (which consequently require causes), and that such a fact is self-evident.
Proposition #4: That which has intrinsic existence in its essence must be changeless in its essence.
Proof: from Proposition #3, any change would necessitate a cause; and that which has intrinsic existence is, by definition, causeless (cf. Proposition #2); therefore, that which has intrinsic existence cannot admit of change. Or, to put the matter differently: if the statement "that which admits of change(s) must thereby require a cause" is true (which it is, by Proposition #3), then the contrapositive of that statement is also necessarily true: "that which does not require a cause (i.e. has intrinsic existence) does not admit of change"--which is the thesis statement of Proposition #4.
Proposition #4a: Every “chain” of extrinsically caused objects must have an uncaused cause (i.e. a cause with intrinsic existence) as its ultimate source; a hypothetical “infinite regression of extrinsic causes” would be empty of content (i.e. would not exist at all).
Proof: By definition, an extrinsically caused (i.e. contingent) object does not possess existence by its nature (as would an object with intrinsic existence); it must "borrow" (i.e. "depend/subsist on") existence from its antecedent cause (see Proposition #2). If the ontological antecedent of a contingent object is itself contingent, then it must in turn "borrow" existence from its own antecedent, and so on, in turn; but if there were a hypothetical infinite string of consecutive "ontological causes", none of which possessed ontological existence in and of itself (but which was dependent on its ontological antecedent), then the total ontological content of that string would be "... + 0 + 0 + 0 + ...", without reaching a term of actual value (i.e. the total content would be "0").
Illustrations for this idea abound, but here's a popular one: picture a string of people going to see a movie, and passing the ticket booth; and picture each successive person, when asked to pay for a ticket, point to the person in back, saying: "He'll pay for me!" If the string of movie-goers were infinite, the ticket-taker would never get paid.
Objection #3: "Cannot an object exist intrinsically in its essence, but extrinsically in its accidents and/or attendant attributes? In other words, cannot an object with intrinsic existence somehow contain accidental attributes which are extrinsic, and therefore subject to change?"
Reply #3: That question is not germane to the issue at hand; the only objection which could have weight against proposition #4 would be an instance where an object with intrinsic ESSENTIAL existence was subject to change in that essence. It is enough to say that, if there were (hypothetically) attendant accidents to an object with intrinsic essential existence, they would themselves require causes to the extent that they existed extrinsically, and certainly to the extent that they exhibited change.
Proposition #5: That which has intrinsic essential existence must necessarily be eternal in its essence.
Proof: Change, by its very nature, necessitates time, and vice-versa. Time is a dimension of space which has meaning (and even existence) only when some manner of change exists; functionally, time is a measure of change, and it cannot operate on that in which there is no change in which progress could be measured. Since that which has intrinsic existence is changeless by definition, it must necessarily be immune to time, and therefore eternal (by definition).
Proposition #6: Any uncaused cause must be eternal and unchanging in its essence; its essential existence must be utterly beyond space/time.
Proof: see Propositions #4 and 5. Note that the pseudo-converse of this proposition (i.e. "that which is in eternity must have intrinsic essential existence") is not necessarily true (and is known, by Divine Revelation, to be false: e.g. angels).
Objection #4: "These arguments depend entirely on the idea that objects are strictly simple ones--that each object is the result of only one cause. This cannot be maintained, since any composite object will necessarily have component parts which need causes--possibly from many different venues (e.g. color, shape, etc.)."
Reply #4: The above propositions are most easily applied to simple objects; that is true. However, composite objects are--by definition--reducible to simple parts, which themselves would be described by these propositions. Consider, also, that even a composite object *can* have a single ontological cause (though it need not), which would be covered under these scenarios.
Objection #5: "Some attributes of composite objects simply can't be 'parsed' like that; how, for example, could we speak of a cause for an apple's shape, another cause for its redness, another for its rigidity, etc.? It's equivocal to say that 'the apple exists', when in fact its shape, color, rigidity, etc., all exist as well."
Reply #5: This may well be a shortcoming of my argument due to a neglect of the various types of causes; a formal cause, for example, could well differ from an accidental cause or a material cause, and so on. However, the same principle holds: every "caused" object (be that object a "physical object" as considered by common idiom, or a single attribute of any such object--which is an "object" in the sense of that which holds ontological existence, and has a cause which answers the question "WHY is that so?") must trace itself to an ultimately uncaused cause.
Proposition #7: Any uncaused cause will necessarily be identical with its very existence (i.e. its essence and existence must be equivalent).
Proof: First, consider three aspects of any object: (a) the object itself, (b) the object’s existence, and (c) the object’s reason for existence. When considering an uncaused cause, the reason for its existence is, by definition, contained within itself—i.e. it exists by its very nature. Thus, (b) = (c). It remains to be demonstrated that (a) = (c), which would consequently show that (a) = (b).
All objects have a "reason for existence" [hereafter: "reason"]; that reason would be either external (if the object is contingent) or internal (if the object is uncaused). Given that the reason for an uncaused cause is necessarily internal to it[self], this leaves three situational comparisons:
(#1) The object's reason exceeds the object.
(#2) The object exceeds its reason.
(#3) The object is identical to its reason.
Situation #1 would entail a contradiction of the definitions of "uncaused" and "internal", since a reason cannot be contained in (i.e. "internal to") its object if the reason exceeds that object.
Situation #2 would entail "parts" of the object which were distinct from the reason itself (i.e. which were not in the "province" of the reason); as such, those "remainder aspects" would be contingent on the (internal but distinct) reason, and would thereby "disqualify" themselves from "membership" in the utterly non-contingent, uncaused cause.
Therefore, #3 is the only situation which does not prove itself to be absurd. As such, (a) = (c), which necessitates that (a) = (b).
Objection #6: "Could it not be possible to speak of multiple "reasons" for an object's existence? For example, would it not be valid to suggest that a biological mother AND father would be reasons for a child's existence?
Reply #6: It is certainly possible to speak of multiple reasons for existence… provided that we are speaking of contingent objects (e.g. the child in question would have far more reasons for existence: proper temperature for survival, adequate food supply, etc.), but it's quite beside the point in this case. Even if a plurality of reasons within an uncaused cause were possible (and that will be shown to be untenable), the main issue of this idea is whether or not the reason(s) is (are) INTERNAL or EXTERNAL to the object itself; the very same scenarios (a,b, and c, from proposition #7) would apply; the only difference would be that any multiple reasons, as a collective whole, would be identical to the object itself.
Proposition #8: Any uncaused cause will necessarily be identical with existence itself.
Proof: By proposition #7, any uncaused cause is identical to its own existence. In addition, all contingent objects have existence which is not theirs by nature; despite temporal illusions to the contrary, no contingent object is "given" existence in any essential way, as if it were somehow given existence apart from its cause (ref: Proposition #2). A contingent object is no less contingent (i.e. dependent on its cause for existence) during any subsequent point in time than it is at its temporal beginning.
Since the sum-total of contingent existence (as reflected in the sum-total of existing contingent objects—we can call it “C”) is within (and "borrowed from") the uncaused cause (since no contingent object has existence in and of itself, but relies on the existence of its cause), and since the totality of existence (we can call this “T”) entails the union of contingent existence (“C”) and intrinsic existence (we can call this “I”); then that totality (“T”) of existence is identical to the uncaused cause itself (see Proposition #7).
Objection #7: Why can there not be several uncaused causes, which would entail SEVERAL sources of existence (rather than just one)? Wouldn't that undermine the equivalence of "uncaused cause" and "existence"?
Reply #7: This question anticipates Proposition #10; but again, it is beside this particular point. If, hypothetically, there were several uncaused causes, then it would still be necessarily true for the uncaused causes, as a collective, to be equivalent to existence as such, given the equivalence between an uncaused cause's reason and its existence, and given the utter lack of existence contained per se in the non-intrinsically-existing objects.
Proposition #9: Any uncaused cause (i.e. whose essential existence is intrinsic) must be unlimited in all respects.
Proof: Limitation, per se, is the extent to which something does not exist. For example: that which exists as a 4'-radius sphere does not exist beyond that radius; or, that which occupies 1 cubic foot of space in region X does not exist thusly at any point Y beyond the boundaries of that enclosed space; etc. That which exists in every way would necessarily be unlimited in every way; and that which was utterly unlimited would enjoy the fullness of existence.
Here is an alternate way to demonstrate the same idea: it is true that all "limited" objects must be caused, since any object which is limited cannot be identified with existence as such, and cannot contain its own reason for existence (as would be necessary with any uncaused object--see Props. #7,8). This establishes the conditional statement: "that which is limited, is caused." Given that this is a true statement, then its contrapositive must necessarily be true, which reads: "that which is uncaused, is unlimited."
Objection #8: What of the aspects of reality which do not seem to imply lack? You wouldn't say that a male was limited in his existence to the extent that he wasn't female, would you? If so, then which one out of a man and woman would be limited by not being the other gender? In short: what about the cases where two seemingly "existing" things are mutually exclusive?
Reply #8: Again, as per reply #2, it is not the purpose of this proposition to make affective or subjective judgments about any given object. It is certainly true that a male simply does not have the faculties of a female, and vice versa... but any criticism of that state of affairs remains a subjective one; the fact that a male lacks female attributes, etc., is still a fact. It does not mean to imply that a male is not functioning properly by failing, for example, to be female. It merely shows one of many evidences that prove the limitation and non-universality of any contingent object.
In the case of a square and a circle, for example, one might say that a square could be a perfect square--and a circle could be a perfect circle--without containing the attributes of one another. While this is true, it is quite beside the point; save to give further proof of the limitations and non-universality of both.
It might help to consider the following: any order of being which holds mutually exclusive possibilities must be limited, by definition. There is no question of any circle, no matter how large, being unlimited in all respects, for example; its "circleness" requires a center and constant radius, or else it ceases to be a circle altogether. Its very definition requires limitations.
Proposition #10: An uncaused cause cannot admit of plurality of nature (i.e. there cannot be more than one uncaused cause).
Proof: It is a truism in logic that any two objects which fail to differ in any way whatsoever are, in fact, the same object. If we can show that any two hypothetical "uncaused causes" do not differ in any way whatever (or if we can show directly that the two are identical), then that will suffice to show the uniqueness and singularity of the uncaused cause. (Note that this method can be extended to cover an arbitrary number of uncaused causes.)
Suppose (A) and (B) are uncaused causes. This implies that (A) is identical with existence (E) as such, and (B) is identical with existence (E) as such. It cannot be true that two objects which identify with existence, per se, admit of any differences whatever. Thus, since A = E and B = E, we conclude that A = B.
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Conclusion: Here is the argument, thus far:
1) No object can be its own cause.
2) Causation implies change, and vice versa.
3) Any uncaused object is necessarily eternal.
4) Any uncaused cause is equivalent to existence per se.
5) Any uncaused cause must be unlimited and unique.
6) Our universe contains examples of changeable, non-eternal objects.
7) Ergo, an uncaused cause is required, as per #3-5.
Since it is self-evident that there exist both instances of change and limited (i.e. contingent) objects, there must necessarily exist a cause for these (i.e. to cause the change, and to be a source of existence for the contingent objects) which is itself uncaused, eternal, unlimited, unique, and identical to existence itself... and this we call God.
33 comments:
Since it is self-evident that there exist both instances of change and limited (i.e. contingent) objects, there must necessarily exist a cause for these (i.e. to cause the change, and to be a source of existence for the contingent objects) which is itself uncaused, eternal, unlimited, unique, and identical to existence itself... and this we call God.
I didn't take the time to follow your logic, but it makes sense. However, note that the God you've proven is very abstract. It does not necessarily have an intellect, let alone an interest in what human beings do.
Keep up the good work. I think I had a flash of insight as to why so many have rejected reason. Thanks.
Ori: [...] note that the God you've proven is very abstract. It does not necessarily have an intellect, let alone an interest in what human beings do.
Definitely! It's a starting point, at best... and its main purpose (well... I should say, the purpose of any proof of God that *works*--time will tell if mine does, or not!) is to remove "atheist-esque stumbling blocks" from the paths of people who're searching for God.
Ken & Carol: I think I had a flash of insight as to why so many have rejected reason.
(LOL!) The same reason why so many people have embraced Tylenol, you mean? :)
Have you read St Thomas Aquinas 5 "proofs" (sic)? Very similar to that. Didn't know this argument was still in circulation. Some nice editions, though.
"Evidence from design" seems the most popular argument in favour of God these days.
This hardly constitutes evidence of God. And anyway, isn't God about faith, not proof?
I could just substitute into the last paragraph the word "big-bang" in place of God, and hey presto, we have evidence of the Big Bang.
Have you read St Thomas Aquinas 5 "proofs" (sic)?
It seems that John is right: "sic"-ness is catching! :)
Yes, I have. I even "refuted" all five of them, back in college... only to find, years later, that my refutations were largely nonsense, and totally inadequate to the task (though my philosophy professor gave me an "A" on that paper, so he must've thought they were adequate; but that's another story altogether).
Very similar to that.
Right... and I reference him, explicitly, in the intro to this post. I'm not such a fool as to re-invent wheels which Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas sculpted with far more skill than I could hope to have.
"Evidence from design" seems the most popular argument in favour of God these days.
It's a strong one, though--in this age of materialism--it's not rigourous enough for my purposes.
This hardly constitutes evidence of God.
Could you explain why you don't think so?
And anyway, isn't God about faith, not proof?
Belief in God is about faith, certainly; but faith and proof are not mutually exclusive. Faith isn't a "brainless jump into the beyond"; it's a choice to trust in a reliable authority. A similar (though entirely non-supernatural) type of "faith" allows me to believe that George Washington was the first president of the United States, though such a fact is beyond all possible means of reproducing or confirming it empirically, beyond all doubt. For a posteriori affairs, we're forced to rely on extrinsic proofs which prove their claims beyond all *reasonable* doubt--i.e. where to reject the claims would entail a violation of sane reason.
I could just substitute into the last paragraph the word "big-bang" in place of God, and hey presto, we have evidence of the Big Bang.
My proof, in particular, insists that the uncaused cause be eternal and unchanging, among other things; I don't see how the "Big Bang", as a momentary event, satisfies those conditions at all. (I'll add, for the record, that I don't have any particular objections to the theory of the Big Bang--but it doesn't explain itself, since it's momentary and an "event" by definition, so it can't have intrinsic existence... and it requires its own cause.)
Sincerely, I really appreciate the tone of that response. Thank you, Brian.
Oli says: This hardly constitutes evidence of God.
Could you explain why you don't think so?
This argument rests on the idea of a regress and invokes God to terminate it. You make the highly-unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress. Even if I allow you the dubious luxury of conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with the qualities usually ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity in design and so on.
Would it not be more parsimonious to conjure up, say, a "big-bang singularity", or some other physical concept as yet unknown. Calling it God is at best unhelpful and at worst perniciously misleading.
Hi, Oliver,
You wrote:
Sincerely, I really appreciate the tone of that response. Thank you, Brian.
:) Likewise. Honestly, this (civil, cordial, etc.) type of discussion is what I like best, and the "hammer-and-tongs" style is one that I pick up only unwillingly. God willing, I will never reply to any plaintive, sincere and polite question with vitriol, rancor, sarcasm, or the like; it's only when people "come in with guns blazing" (i.e. ready to "pick a fight") or come in with blatant disrespect (shown by mockery, "sneering" language, and such) that I need to get more stern and severe in my manner.
[Oliver] This hardly constitutes evidence of God.
[Paladin]
Could you explain why you don't think so?
[Oliver]
This argument rests on the idea of a regress and invokes God to terminate it. You make the highly-unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress.
Not exactly. I propose that an infinite ontological regress is impossible, that any "regress of causality" must ultimately trace itself to an uncaused cause (which exists by its very nature, and was not itself caused), and that such an uncaused cause must necessarily be eternal, unchanging, unlimited, identical to existence itself, and one, aside from other possible characteristics not covered in this proof attempt. As Ori pointed out (and you suggested), it's true that this proof doesn't pretend to prove that the Triune God of Judeo-Christian belief and this "uncaused cause" are provably One and the Same Being; that would need to be shown from additional arguments--and arguments which are a posteriori, not a priori (like this one is, for the most part).
Even if I allow you the dubious luxury of conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with the qualities usually ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity in design and so on.
That's true; see above. The terms you mention would have little or no meaning if the "uncaused cause" were impersonal (i.e. no intellect and will), though I think I could even argue that the uncaused cause must necessarily be good, given proper definitions of "good" and "evil" (e.g. "evil" is "the privation of a good which, by the nature of the object in question, should be present").
Would it not be more parsimonious to conjure up, say, a "big-bang singularity", or some other physical concept as yet unknown.
Parsimonious (i.e. minimalist), perhaps; but one must be careful not to simplify beyond validity! "Occham's Razor" (so-called) is often woefully misapplied by those who forget the second part of the definition: "It is vain to explain with more that which is able to be explained with less." The "razor" is only useful in choosing between explanations which are equiprobable; if a "simpler" explanation is less sound, then not even its simplicity will save it from being discarded by those who are sensible.
As to your main point: you're correct in saying that it's hasty to take the aforementioned "uncaused cause" and label it "God" without further explanation, context, and the like; but fair is fair, here: at very least, if the proof is sound, it refutes the atheist and agnostic who claim that "there is no reason to suggest the existence of a supreme being". I beg to differ, as does the Angelic Doctor. Further explanations are needed to show that the uncaused cause and the God of Jesus Christ are One, certainly; but the necessity of step #2 shouldn't eclipse step #1.
Calling it God is at best unhelpful and at worst perniciously misleading.
Well... in all fairness, I could say the same thing about any term invoking the "big bang" in its name; if your task is to object to any premature claims, then it's rather premature to claim absolute certainty of the "big bang"--especially when the term is so imperfectly defined.
here: at very least, if the proof is sound, it refutes the atheist and agnostic who claim that "there is no reason to suggest the existence of a supreme being"
I think it's worth pointing out that neither the atheist nor the agnostic believes there "is no reason" to suggest the existence of a "supreme being".
Remember, the agnostic says you can't know (i.e. anything is possible).
The atheist simply believes there is no evidence to suggest a god (eternal) and, whilst accepting the possibility of a god, finds it very improbable indeed.
A supreme being is of different significance to the atheist because if you posit a "supreme being" you could be describing a highly-evolved and advanced species. This supreme being wouldn't be as improbable as a god because it wouldn't have had to "always have been, eternal, omnipotent etc".
though I think I could even argue that the uncaused cause must necessarily be good, given proper definitions of "good" and "evil" (e.g. "evil" is "the privation of a good which, by the nature of the object in question, should be present").
I'm a bit worried about this one. Are you saying that because we have the words good and evil, and because evil can't exist without good, then good must exist and god must be good?
I heard this one before, or one similar. Basically, that we have notions of good and bad and because we do their must be perfect example of good, and that perfect example must be god, thus god exists.
it's only when people "come in with guns blazing" (i.e. ready to "pick a fight") or come in with blatant disrespect (shown by mockery, "sneering" language, and such) that I need to get more stern and severe in my manner.
What I would say is that sometimes I feel that my and others views are sometimes misrepresented, mischaracterised and distorted in such a way that you're not actually making an argument you're just casually slinging contempt for opposing views and creating dark caricatures . Not always, just occasionally.
paladin said...
I propose that an infinite ontological regress is impossible, that any "regress of causality" must ultimately trace itself to an uncaused cause...and that such an uncaused cause must necessarily be eternal, unchanging, unlimited, identical to existence itself
Let me raise a few small ideas.
First:
1) The concept of a "Cause" has no meaning outside of time.
2) If the universe has infinite mass (which is unknown), and relativity and big bang theory are correct, then time had a beginning at the big bang expansion.
3) If time had a beginning, it makes no more sense to posit a "cause" for it's beginning, as it does to ask "what is north of the north pole?".
Also: mass does in fact pop into existence all the time with no known cause or explanation other than "quantum effect" (personally, I think quantum theory is far from the correct explanation of reality, but that's a whole nother ball of wax)
Second:
1) It's possible that big bang theory is wrong, and that the universe had no beginning. Our "extrapolation" based on red-shift and background radiation may still be far off the mark.
2) That may make the universe itself the un-caused eternal regression termination you're looking for.
Third:
For me, the important part of all this, is the recognition that, while science has progressively improved our understanding of reality, we have to admit that all our ideas and models about the origin of the universe are tentative, uncertain, and will continue to be built brick-by-brick as we discover more about the nature of reality.
Lastly,
To speak to Ori's objection: Our only knowledge of intelligence or "that which thinks" (can't find a better way to phrase that) is the result of a physical brain, so to posit such a thing as a first cause of the universe seems a non-sequitur.
Good heavens! A comment, on my all-too-neglected blog! :) (Is this a sign that I should carve some time and post here, every once in a while?)
Hi, Mike!
You wrote:
1) The concept of a "Cause" has no meaning outside of time.
If we're using "cause" in the ontological sense (i.e. "the ground of being", or "that which is responsible for the existence/maintenance of all that exists"), there's no need of time. In fact, it would be impossible for such a "creation" to be WITHIN time, since the jump from "timelessness" to "time" obviously cannot occur within time. I'm not saying that we could *imagine* that, per se; but we can conceive it, as we conceive the quadratic formula.
2) If the universe has infinite mass (which is unknown), and relativity and big bang theory are correct, then time had a beginning at the big bang expansion.
True.
3) If time had a beginning, it makes no more sense to posit a "cause" for it's beginning, as it does to ask "what is north of the north pole?".
Yes, and no. It would make no sense to ask, "What happened 'before time began'?", but I do not ask that. It would make perfect sense to ask, "What caused time/space to exist at all?"
Also: mass does in fact pop into existence all the time with no known cause or explanation other than "quantum effect" (personally, I think quantum theory is far from the correct explanation of reality, but that's a whole nother ball of wax)
Right... but the key word is known (and bravo, for using the qualifier! I debated with a sort of "quantum atheist" who dogmatically insisted that such particles appeared for no reason, whatsoever). I have no idea how the "quantum effect" works; but it's not germane to the issue at hand; I would merely insist that every such "pop" of a "new particle" have an external cause (since it could not cause itself to begin existing).
1) It's possible that big bang theory is wrong, and that the universe had no beginning. Our "extrapolation" based on red-shift and background radiation may still be far off the mark.
It's possible that the Big Bang theory, as it stands, could be wrong; but that doesn't affect the case; even a hypothetical universe of "infinite time length" (which I think is impossible, given that the universe is in motion) would require a cause for its existence, per se.
2) That may make the universe itself the un-caused eternal regression termination you're looking for.
I'm afraid that wouldn't work; see Proposition #4a.
For me, the important part of all this, is the recognition that, while science has progressively improved our understanding of reality, we have to admit that all our ideas and models about the origin of the universe are tentative, uncertain, and will continue to be built brick-by-brick as we discover more about the nature of reality.
Certainly... but you're speaking mainly of empirical science (which is data-dependent), and I'm speaking mostly of ontology (the philosophical/logical study of "being, itself"); there are certain principles which we can establish as fact, without data to confirm them.
To speak to Ori's objection: Our only knowledge of intelligence or "that which thinks" (can't find a better way to phrase that) is the result of a physical brain, so to posit such a thing as a first cause of the universe seems a non-sequitur.
Caution: we're under the *conclusion* (based on a posteriori experimentation) that thought is the "result" of a physical brain... but that is not a proven fact. Consider two objects: object [x] has thoughts generated by a brain, and object [y] generates thoughts which are transmitted, or made manifest by a brain. Given only that you posit thoughts (extrapolated from actions), how would you know the difference? Mere brain activity doesn't settle the issue in the least.
paladin said...
Hi, Mike!
Hey Paladin, Oliver, Ori, et al. I succumbed to the temptation to peek at some blog feeds, and find myself getting sucked back in. Crap!
it would be impossible for such a "creation" to be WITHIN time, since the jump from "timelessness" to "time" obviously cannot occur within time.
True. In fact, NOTHING can happen outside of time. An action, any action, such as "creation" or "jump[ing] from", thinking, etc., can only have meaning within the context of time.
2) If the universe has infinite mass (which is unknown), and relativity and big bang theory are correct, then time had a beginning at the big bang expansion.
paladin said...
True...It would make no sense to ask, "What happened 'before time began'?", but I do not ask that. It would make perfect sense to ask, "What caused time/space to exist at all?"
Those questions both reduce to the same thing, because "causing something" is a description of a "happening" which requires time. I don't think you mean "cause" I think you mean "reason". A "reason" for something doesn't imply time, but a "cause" does.
I debated with a sort of "quantum atheist" who dogmatically insisted that such particles appeared for no reason, whatsoever
I would merely insist that every such "pop" of a "new particle" have an external cause.
I agree that an insistence that there definitely is no cause, is dogmatic, but insisting that there must be a cause is equally dogmatic. Clearly there IS a reason, even if it is not causal in nature.
I suspect that you are right, and there is a cause that we are unaware of, but it is also possible that while one "reason" is statistical chance, there is no "cause" A similar thing is true for the universe, except that *if infinite*, there actually can't be a cause, unless we redefine the word cause. There *can be* a reason though. But we (all of us) don't know if or what that is.
even a hypothetical universe of "infinite time length" (which I think is impossible, given that the universe is in motion) would require a cause for its existence, per se.
As above, "reason" maybe, "cause", no. Unless you want to posit a new time dimension that we don't experience for these causes to take place within.
to be continued...
...character limit continuation:
2) That may make the universe itself the un-caused eternal regression termination you're looking for.
paladin said...
I'm afraid that wouldn't work; see Proposition #4a.
Perhaps I misunderstand, but that proposition tries to refute infinite-regression. I'm not proposing that here.
As for the expansion, there are some that are looking into the possibility that that is only an appearance caused by an undiscovered property of the universe. I'm not saying I buy that, just that it's being investigated, and has a greater than zero possibility.
To speak to Ori's objection: Our only knowledge of intelligence or "that which thinks" (can't find a better way to phrase that) is the result of a physical brain, so to posit such a thing as a first cause of the universe seems a non-sequitur.
paladin said...
Caution: we're under the *conclusion* (based on a posteriori experimentation) that thought is the "result" of a physical brain... but that is not a proven fact. Consider two objects: object [x] has thoughts generated by a brain, and object [y] generates thoughts which are transmitted, or made manifest by a brain. Given only that you posit thoughts (extrapolated from actions), how would you know the difference? Mere brain activity doesn't settle the issue in the least.
I agree that it is *possible* that the thoughts we see as being generated from a brain *could* really be coming from some unseen dimension, spiritual realm, or supernatural place, and the brain is the conduit, but it also possible that solid objects aren't really solid in our four dimensions, but rather get their solidity from a supernatural dimension. Both ideas seem like wild conjecture. Do you have any information that might support either conjecture?
Sorry about the delay... real life overwhelms, again! I'll try to get back to this when I can!
*Finaly*, a few moments (and only a week late) to reply!
Mike wrote:
Hey Paladin, Oliver, Ori, et al. I succumbed to the temptation to peek at some blog feeds, and find myself getting sucked back in. Crap!
:) I know the feeling. Oh, boy, do I know the feeling!
[Paladin]
it would be impossible for such a "creation" to be WITHIN time, since the jump from "timelessness" to "time" obviously cannot occur within time.
[Mike]
True. In fact, NOTHING can happen outside of time. An action, any action, such as "creation" or "jump[ing] from", thinking, etc., can only have meaning within the context of time.
Yes, and no. We who are within time cannot imagine what timelessness would be like, at all (save, perhaps, for absolute stagnation at a temperature of absolute zero); and it's true that every figure of speech I try to use to describe extra-temporal things will be "tainted" with temporal-sounding ideas... but that's a limitation on me (and on the English language), not on the supposed extratemporal "stuff" itself.
As for creation being possible outside of time, our comprehension has at least one problem: we have an unconscious tendency to try to "picture" it (i.e. imagine it) in our minds' eyes--a sort of "look around, and see nothing... but then see something new, at a subsequent point"--and that's artificially laden with temporality, since we're thinking sequentially and temporally, already. But we *can* conceive of a condition in which the First Cause "eternally creates" object [x] (even if that "object" happens to be the entire physical universe, complete with timestream). We already know of cases where humans can "pseudo-create" (i.e. manufacture, from existing materials) an object that has very definite limits in 3 dimensions (i.e. fixed length, width and height). It's no more of a stretch to imagine an object "created" with definite limits in the (from our relative position) 4th dimension, also known as "time". It's almost as if God is holding up an object whose existence is completely dependent on Him, and of which God could say, "I can clearly see the limits of this object: its length ranges from A to B [3 inches], its width ranges from C to D [5 inches], its height ranges from E to F [2 inches], and its time existence ranges from January 1, 2009, 12:00 Midnight until January 31, 2089, 2:44:00 PM [80 years, 2 hours, 44 minutes]". The mere fact that its temporal "length" ranges from "here to there" doesn't require sequential "creation" any more than does, say, a cylindrical rod of steel with radius 1" and length 12". From God's perspective, He's *always* known of (and held in existence) that bit of creation, complete with temporal limits; He wasn't limited to "painting it from one side to another", despite the fact that human eyes might be limited to *viewing* such an object sequentially [albeit very quickly], like that.
"causing something" is a description of a "happening" which requires time. I don't think you mean "cause" I think you mean "reason". A "reason" for something doesn't imply time, but a "cause" does.
Well... that may be an issue of mere semantics; St. Thomas Aquinas was familiar with (and used) both terms, and he was satisfied to use the word "cause" for "agency of existence". And "reason" is subtly different, anyway. I'm caused by God (and indirectly by my parents, by the existence of matter, and by all other preconditions for my existence), but my "reason" for existence is mainly because I'm a contingent creature. Case in point: the Uncaused Cause has a reason for existing (i.e. His existence and essence are identical; He contains, and is identical to, His own reason for existence), but He obviously doesn't have a cause (hence "uncaused cause"). But in neither case is temporality necessary (even though, in most cases, causes and reasons for existence *can* be the same).
More in a moment.
(*grumble*) Bloody typos...
Anyway...
[Mike]
That may make the universe itself the un-caused eternal regression termination you're looking for.
[Paladin]
I'm afraid that wouldn't work; see Proposition #4a.
[Mike]
Perhaps I misunderstand, but that proposition tries to refute infinite-regression. I'm not proposing that here.
It also refutes the idea of an "infinite universe" (in the sense of being totally unlimited in time, or "eternal", for the same reason. A "universe" without content is precisely nothing; and a universe filled with finite, limited things is simply an abstraction which refers collectively to that "set of finite, limited things"--all of which require an ultimate cause which is beyond them (i.e. they do not compose "part" of the uncaused cause--or else this would suggest that "those parts" of the uncaused cause were somehow "missing" from that cause, "before" [forgive the temporality-laden word] they were created, which is nonsense). In other words: the universe cannot be a cause at all, since the very word has no meaning without created objects. I realize that we humans try to imagine "an empty room" when trying to conceive of a universe apart from its objects... but even an empty room is made up of objects [e.g. walls, ceiling, etc.], and the universe simply doesn't "exist" independently from its "contents", like that.
[Paladin]
Caution: we're under the *conclusion* (based on a posteriori experimentation) that thought is the "result" of a physical brain... but that is not a proven fact. Consider two objects: object [x] has thoughts generated by a brain, and object [y] generates thoughts which are transmitted, or made manifest by a brain. Given only that you posit thoughts (extrapolated from actions), how would you know the difference? Mere brain activity doesn't settle the issue in the least.
[Mike]
I agree that it is *possible* that the thoughts we see as being generated from a brain *could* really be coming from some unseen dimension, spiritual realm, or supernatural place, and the brain is the conduit, but it also possible that solid objects aren't really solid in our four dimensions, but rather get their solidity from a supernatural dimension. Both ideas seem like wild conjecture.
Well... "seem" (which, in this context, implies a matter of personal judgment/taste) isn't really rigourous enough to use as a basis for an objection, just yet. But my point was not to "prove" the "brain = conduit" (I'd rather use "brain = tool which the soul manipulates, as a surgeon uses a scalpel") idea, but to refute the claim that "thought must be assumed to be generated by the brain, until proven otherwise."
Do you have any information that might support either conjecture?
Yes (though I'm not sure what you'd think of it)... but it's not to the point. Those who naively assume that "brain = generator of all personality" have (perhaps unwittingly) embraced a *philosophy* (i.e. materialism) which is utterly unsupported by empirical data. Sense-data says nothing, one way or the other, about the ultimate source of personality, etc.; and the fact that many moderns take the "materialism" explanation as self-evident fact is indicative not of their skill, but of their ignorance of philosophy. Earlier, you wrote:
Our only knowledge of intelligence or "that which thinks" (can't find a better way to phrase that) is the result of a physical brain
...and this is not true at all; it's an assumption without fact. *IF* materialism is correct, and *IF* our sense-data (and organs by which it is gathered) is reliable (I'd agree with the second "if", but not with the first, BTW), THEN we could start saying things about brains "generating" thoughts. But a few seconds' thought will show that there is no such thing as "empirical evidence for materialism"; it's question-begging, and it's as illogical as asking that a known liar promise that he's telling the truth, before trusting him!
Paladin said...
We who are within time cannot imagine what timelessness would be like, at all...
...we *can* conceive of a condition in which the First Cause "eternally creates" object [x] (even if that "object" happens to be the entire physical universe, complete with timestream).
Those two statements are contradictory. If one cannot conceive of extra-temporality at all, then one certainly cannot conceive of an extra-temporal "first cause" to time itself. The simple implication of relativity is that the universe itself is self caused.
...my point was...... to refute the claim that "thought must be assumed to be generated by the brain, until proven otherwise."
You're refuting a misstatment of my position. I would say "thoughts are seen to have the brain as their source, and, while possible, there is no evidence other than supposition to support the idea that the brain not the ultimate source."
Those who naively assume that "brain = generator of all personality" have (perhaps unwittingly) embraced a *philosophy*...
I'm sorry, but this is another misstatement of position. The idea that the brain is the source of personality is something the evidence points to, not a naive assumption. Asserting that it cannot be, and it must be something else beyond it which there is no evidence for, is a naive assumption.
Sense-data says nothing, one way or the other, about the ultimate source of personality, etc.
Only if you assume the data to be incorrect because you already have conclusions otherwise. Again, while possible, there is no evidence other than supposition to support the idea that the brain not the ultimate source.
...the fact that many moderns take the "materialism" explanation as self-evident fact...
One can only know what one can know. If you cannot know of anything extra-material, then to propose a hidden cause behind an apparent one is conjecture without basis.
there is no such thing as "empirical evidence for materialism"
There is reality, and there is fantasy. If by "immaterial" you mean "that which cannot be observed or measured" then we have no way to distinguish it from fantasy.
Mike wrote:
[Paladin]
We who are within time cannot imagine what timelessness would be like, at all [...] we *can* conceive of a condition in which the First Cause "eternally creates" object [x] [...]
[Mike]
Those two statements are contradictory. If one cannot conceive of extra-temporality at all, then one certainly cannot conceive of an extra-temporal "first cause" to time itself.
Well... no, I didn't say that one cannot conceive of extra-temporality (yes, we can, intellectually); I said that we cannot imagine it... and I chose the word carefully. "Imagine" means to "make an image of [in our minds]", and obviously we can't imagine timelessness, any more than we can physically "imagine" quantum particles; but we can conceive--"bring the idea into being in our minds, and analyze it, etc."--of the idea. We can talk coherently about it.
The simple implication of relativity is that the universe itself is self caused.
That can't possibly be the case; see Proposition #1.
[Mike]
I would say "thoughts are seen to have the brain as their source, and, while possible, there is no evidence other than supposition to support the idea that the brain not the ultimate source."
I would flip that around, and point out that you have (and can have) no evidence, whatsoever, that thoughts "are seen to have the brain as their source." As an exercise to illustrate the unspoken assumption: can you explain, exactly and clearly, why you think the brain is a "generator" rather than a "nexus point" or "transmitter" or "conduit"?
The idea that the brain is the source of personality is something the evidence points to, not a naive assumption.
I think we've already agreed (below) that there is not, nor can there be, "evidence" for or against the proposition at all...
Asserting that it cannot be, and it must be something else beyond it which there is no evidence for, is a naive assumption.
You'll notice that I did not assert anything of the sort. I introduced a possibility, in response to your assertion that the brain "is" the source of thoughts/personality/etc., and your further (incorrect) assertion that there is somehow "evidence" for such an assertion.
Sense-data says nothing, one way or the other, about the ultimate source of personality, etc.
Precisely my point.
Again, while possible, there is no evidence other than supposition to support the idea that the brain not the ultimate source.
Right. But there's also no evidence other than supposition to support the idea that the brain is the ultimate source.
[Paladin]
...the fact that many moderns take the "materialism" explanation as self-evident fact...
[Mike]
If you cannot know of anything extra-material, then to propose a hidden cause behind an apparent one is conjecture without basis.
We may not have the definition of "materialism" clear, here. Materialism is the belief that everything is made of matter, and that no "non-material" things (such as spirit) exist. It's a philosophical statement, and--as you astutely pointed out--no empirical data can possibly say "yea" or "nay" to it at all. See below.
[Mike]
There is reality, and there is fantasy. If by "immaterial" you mean "that which cannot be observed or measured" then we have no way to distinguish it from fantasy.
That simply isn't true, and you're buying into the David Hume line of "if it can't be measured or indicated by sense data, its existence cannot be admitted"; do you think so about love, courage, heroism, and the like? But even beyond emotional/cerebral phenomena, we've already agreed that there is no "evidence" for the idea that the brain "produces/generates" thoughts, yes?
[Mike]
Those two statements are contradictory. If one cannot conceive of extra-temporality at all, then one certainly cannot conceive of an extra-temporal "first cause" to time itself.
[Paladin]
Well... no, I didn't say that one cannot conceive... I said that we cannot imagine it...
Any "conception" of a thing involves at least some thought about it (however inadequate) in your mind, so to say that we "cannot imagine what timelessness would be like, at all" is also to say it cannot be conceived. Both of which are false IMHO.
Here's a dictionary definition:
Conceive - verb
1. to form (a notion, opinion, purpose, etc.): He conceived the project while he was on vacation.
2. to form a notion or idea of; imagine.
3. to hold as an opinion; think; believe: I can't conceive that it would be of any use.
This is a contradictory argument using synonymous words, while trying to differentiate the meaning of these words to attempt to obfuscate this contradiction. Nonetheless, the point is that nothing can "happen" extra-temporally, including "creation" of the temporal stream.
[Mike]
The simple implication of relativity is that the universe itself is self caused.
[Paladin]
That can't possibly be the case; see Proposition #1.
It can be the case if your proposition is wrong, and it is.
Your proof is trivially impossible. Let me restate your proof for this specific test: "If the universe is uncaused (a), then the universe cannot be it's own cause (1)" That's either a non-sequitur or it's contradictory.
...can you explain, exactly and clearly, why you think the brain is a "generator" rather than a "nexus point" or "transmitter" or "conduit"?
Sure. First, I don't assume it is the ultimate source, that's just where the evidence points.
I don't postulate that it is really the penultimate source, or the antepenultimate, or that the real source is 27 levels removed, because there is no reason to believe such a thing. Each is equally (in)valid. So I don't think there is a hidden source 27 levels removed for the same reason you don't. If you're going to add one hidden level as the "true" source without evidence, why not add 27?
[Mike]
The idea that the brain is the source of personality is something the evidence points to, not a naive assumption.
[Paladin]
I think we've already agreed (below) that there is not, nor can there be, "evidence" for or against the proposition at all...
...But there's also no evidence other than supposition to support the idea that the brain is the ultimate source.
There is evidence that points to the brain as the source. If you want to postulate that it isn't the ultimate source, but rather is a channel from the ultimate source, and that there can be no evidence for that assertion, I'll respect that, but there's really isn't much that can be said about that which cannot be known, nor is there reason to postulate it gratuitously.
It's trivially obvious that: that for which there can be no evidence, cannot be known in any way.
We may not have the definition of "materialism" clear, here. Materialism is the belief that everything is made of matter, and that no "non-material" things (such as spirit) exist.
If that is your definition, then I am not a materialist. Bu in fact, I think no one is. I suspect this "materialist" label is in fact a straw-man. But rather than argue definitions, let me just tell you my position; That is, there are intangible things which can be shown empirically to exist, yet aren't made of what one would call "material", e.g. time, force, thought. These are all things that exist within reality. I would use the word "reality", because both tangible and intangible things exist within it. As an aside, I recognize that the word "materialist" is often used as a very subtle ad-hominem because it also has a derogatory meaning of a person who is greedy.
[Mike]
There is reality, and there is fantasy. If by "immaterial" you mean "that which cannot be observed or measured" then we have no way to distinguish it from fantasy.
[Paladin]
...you're buying into the David Hume line of "if it can't be measured or indicated by sense data, its existence cannot be admitted"; do you think so about love, courage, heroism, and the like?
The things you mention are intangible, but can be said to exist, and can be shown to exist empirically, to the extent that they can be defined (which, of course, is the difficult bit).
[Paladin]
Well... no, I didn't say that one cannot conceive... I said that we cannot imagine it...
[Mike]
Any "conception" of a thing involves at least some thought about it (however inadequate) in your mind, so to say that we "cannot imagine what timelessness would be like, at all" is also to say it cannot be conceived.
Not so. In the original sense of the word (which you can see, in your quoted definition #1), "conceive" = "mentally apprehend", while "imagine" = "picture in your mind". Yes, people get sloppy and use them colloquially and interchangeably, but we're dealing with philosophy, here... and we need to be precise.
For example: I can conceive of a 4th dimension: just find a dimension that's at right angles to the first three (just as the 3rd dimension is at right angles to the first two, and so on). But I cannot imagine it, since I (as a 3-D creature) can only imagine things in 3 dimensions, per se. (Yes, we experience the 4th dimension as "time", but not as a physical direction in which we can point.) There is a very real difference between what we can mentally comprehend (i.e. "conceive"), and what we can imagine (i.e. "mentally picture"). You may not like the distinction, or you might think that the words should have different connotations... but that's really not to the point.
This is a contradictory argument using synonymous words, while trying to differentiate the meaning of these words to attempt to obfuscate this contradiction.
Nonsense. And--by the way--when you say "attempt to obfuscate", you're attributing intellectual dishonesty to me... and I really don't appreciate that. Stick to what you can prove, rather than what you are disposed to assume, please.
Nonetheless, the point is that nothing can "happen" extra-temporally, including "creation" of the temporal stream.
If you're saying that the creation of the temporal stream is not a temporal event, then of course: that's self-evident. But it's quite a different thing (and a wrong statement) to say that a time-stream cannot be created. Yes, the very word "created" is laden with temporal baggage that makes things difficult (when all it's meant to convey is "[x] is the cause of [y]'s existence"), but it's not at all inappropriate.
[Mike]
The simple implication of relativity is that the universe itself is self caused.
[Paladin]
That can't possibly be the case; see Proposition #1.
[Mike]
It can be the case if your proposition is wrong, and it is.
Easily said; not so easily proven, sir... and you've not come within a million miles of doing so; you've merely stated your opinion forcefully... which is fine, as an opinion, but not as a proof.
Your proof is trivially impossible.
Sorry, but that makes no sense; do you mean to say "self-evidently impossible"?
Let me restate your proof for this specific test: "If the universe is uncaused (a), then the universe cannot be it's own cause (1)" That's either a non-sequitur or it's contradictory.
I don't think you're using your terms correctly... and you've stated only the first part of the proof for Proposition #1. Even your example is not at all a non sequitur; the conclusion flows clearly from the premise, yes? If [x] is uncaused, then it obviously didn't cause itself... because NOTHING (including itself) caused it; it didn't need a cause in any case. Is that clear?
As for "contradictory", you'll really have to explain why you think it would be so, for me to comment further.
[Paladin]
[...] can you explain, exactly and clearly, why you think the brain is a "generator" rather than a "nexus point" or "transmitter" or "conduit"?
[Mike]
Sure. First, I don't assume it is the ultimate source, that's just where the evidence points.
Okay... stop, there, for a moment. Can you explain what "evidence" you mean--and how that evidence suggests "generation" more strongly than "transmission"? Because the question of "extra-physical origins" is beyond the scope of the empirical sciences, just as is the question of the "origin of all things". It's a question for philosophy, not empiricism (good as that may be, in its proper venue).
But I do need to ask why you consider such "evidence" as supporting "personality generation" over and above any other model. We can proceed from there, I think.
As an aside, I recognize that the word "materialist" is often used as a very subtle ad-hominem because it also has a derogatory meaning of a person who is greedy.
You're also aware of the fact that some people do *not*, in the midst of an honest debate, use such sundry tactics (and/or sloppy equivocation between divergent definitions)? If I think you're wrong, I'll say so clearly; if I think (and I can't image why I would!) that you're selfish or greedy, I have no problem telling you so in plain language. Please do not attribute the sins of others to me; I have more than enough of my own to handle.
Mike:
I scrabbled through some of my old archives, and I found an answer to someone who'd asked about the "creation" vs. "eternal God" idea (from a different slant); it *might* help to explain what I mean. If not, I'll try again when I have a spare moment.
=== quote ===
From this point, I'd like to address the following objection:
"How can an unchanging God (i.e. first cause, as described above) bring about a universe that hasn't always existed? That would imply that God had at least three states of being: the 'pre-universe' God, the 'universe existing' God, and the 'after the universe dies' God!"
This objection seeks to challenge assumption #4, and seeks to show that God has, in fact, changed. This is an invalid objection, for two main reasons:
1) The definition of "unchanging" need not include the temporally-ridden notion of "static", "dead", or "inert". Christian theology understands God to be (and these terms are also "contaminated" with temporal imagery, admittedly) living, active, and eternally dynamic. In essence, God's nature is a LIVING nature, which does not change. He was, is, and always will be (to borrow more temporally-charged words) living and active; His nature in that respect is unchangeable.
2) The notions of "pre-universe" and "post-universe" Godly existence is an invalid appeal to temporality, from which God is necessarily immune. In one sense (and I'll qualify this, in a moment), God can certainly be said to be "eternally creating the Universe"; there truly never was a "moment" when God was not doing so. But I will need to explain this quite carefully, for fear of placing the universe on the same plane with God the Son, the Second Person of the Trinity (Who is eternally begotten).
A rather simple (and incomplete) answer to this problem is the fact that there CANNOT be a "moment" in which God was not creating the universe, since "moments" exist only in time, which came into being concurrently and consubstantially with the material universe. But there is a rather more complete answer to this seeming dilemma:
When God "creates the universe from Eternity", it can truly be said that there is no moment when God is not doing so; but that is NOT to be confused with the (false) idea that God has created an eternal universe. God's activity in this regard in unchanging, but He has brought forth a finite universe, which itself is limited in space and time--and yet He, Himself, is not WITHIN that temporality, so He is not affected by the concepts of "before" and "after". We humans (and other material creatures) will run out of "earthly moments", eventually, but God is completely above "moments" altogether, so He need not "wait" for the universe to begin, or to end. In essence: God does not "wait" for anything; He's already "there."
[cont'd]
[cont'd from previous]
Here's another way to view the same idea: God COULD have created an eternal universe (with no beginning or end), and God could even have created an immortal universe (with a beginning, but no end; think of the angels, or of our own souls). But when God created the universe, He created it FINITE; it is within time, and it has a limited AMOUNT of time, at that. This "duration" of the universe has nothing whatever to do with the fact that the ACTIVITY and CREATIVITY of God are utterly beyond those limitations. The very idea that God was somehow "sitting on His hands" before the Universe began, is a childish and naive idea based on our own perceptions which are hopelessly tainted with temporality. God did not suddenly become "more active" when the Universe came into being, nor will God "retire to inactivity" when the end of time has come.
At any rate, the objection that "God's creation entails a change in Him" is proven inadequate; it is certainly a change for US, but not for Him.
One might as well, on that point, object that "it is impossible to play a chord on a piano, since every key comes in order on the keyboard, one at a time!" This might indeed be a challenge, if humans had but one finger with which to play; but they have ten (usually!), and they can play at least ten notes simultaneously, in seeming defiance of the "necessary sequence of the notes" on the keyboard. If you'll forgive the image, one might think of God as having an infinite number of fingers with which to play the finite number of keys of the universe's keyboard.
Sorry for the delay. I get busy, and I'm easily distracted, then I feel like to much time has passed to bother. Even now, I'm only writing this to procrastinate from what I should be doing. ;-)
I've been thinking about your idea that the brain is not the ultimate source of thought, feeling, judgment, or morality. At first I conceded that we cannot know if it is the ultimate source, but now I realize that more is understood about the brain than I knew. The fact is, we understand how individual neurons work, and we know that this is electro-chemical. We know the consequences of interrupting them as demonstrated by Dr. Rebecca Saxe in this fascinating video.
It may be arguable that electro-chemical reactions have controlling components which are outside of our observable reality, but there clearly is no basis for postulating that the consciousness, judgments, and feelings which are a result of the complex arrangement of these neurons do. This would be a gross misunderstanding of how the brain works. No one has ever articulated how such a thing could be possible, but I welcome you to try. Not only does this video give a taste of how our brains make us who we are, it shows how particular neurons are even the very seat of our morality. Dr. Saxes' testing shows quite clearly that morality comes from the brain, that it is subjective, and that moral judgment is something that develops slowly. We all think of children as "pure", and that their moral sense may get corrupted as they age, but the contrary is actually true. Children have underdeveloped morals that develop as their brain develops. Neuroscience shows that murderers lack of morality comes directly from brain abnormalities. It is not, as the ancients thought, the work of a devil of demon acting supernaturally on the immoral, but rather, mundane physical problems.
As for the "extra-temporal cause" line of argument, I know it's difficult to imagine, but nothing can "happen" extra-temporally. If time had a beginning, it can't have a cause. The beginning of time a causation boundry. Cause implies time.
Let me make an analogy. Suppose our world only had 2 dimensions as if we lived on an infinitely thin sheet of paper, there would be no up or down. we could not throw a ball up, because there would be no up to throw it to. In the case of time, the temporal dimension exists, but may not be infinate in all directions as theoretical space is. So imagine there is only up but no "down", and you are standing on the edge of reality. Now you can throw a ball in the air, but there is nothing below you. That is not to say it is solid. It is also not empty space. It just doesn't exist. Just as this would not be a place in which anything could exist, because it isn't a place, so too is "before" time. It's not simply that nothing can exist before time, it is that there is no place to exist before time!
Now let's go back to our 2 dimensional world. We can imagine a god that lived outside of our observable reality, in that unseen 3rd dimension, just as we can imagine another time dimension in which a god could exist, from which it/he/she created "our" dimension of time. However, this does not necessarily preclude us from detecting such a dimension, or any gods that may or may not exist within it. But, this would seem to suffer from the same infinate regression problem we already have. If there is a place or time for a god to exist outside of our space time, we would then have the problem of how that place or time came into existence.
Of course as I said before, the universe may not be infinite in mass, and therefore time may not have had a beginning.
So to recap:
Either time and the universe always existed,
or time began uncaused.
Those seem to be the only options supported by evidence.
Mike wrote:
Sorry for the delay. I get busy, and I'm easily distracted, then I feel like to much time has passed to bother. Even now, I'm only writing this to procrastinate from what I should be doing. ;-)
No worries; as you can see from my (ahem) frequency in posting to this blog, I have plenty of other things to occupy myself, too...
I've been thinking about your idea that the brain is not the ultimate source of thought, feeling, judgment, or morality. At first I conceded that we cannot know if it is the ultimate source, but now I realize that more is understood about the brain than I knew. The fact is, we understand how individual neurons work, and we know that this is electro-chemical. We know the consequences of interrupting them as demonstrated by Dr. Rebecca Saxe in this fascinating video.
Right; all of that was known years ago, even before Dr. Saxe's fascinating video... but that doesn't address the main point at all. If the brain is the "main junction box" through which the soul can manifest itself and interact with the physical world through the body, any interruption in it would be as devastating as would be an electrical interruption of Dr. Stephen Hawking's computerized voice system, wheel chair, and so on. (He'd still be able to think, but he'd be rendered largely helpless to communicate/interact.) Think of a brilliant surgeon with laryngitis with all his scalpels and surgical tools broken and/or stolen; the "brilliance" would be rendered impotent. Just so, a person whose brain is damaged.
It may be arguable that electro-chemical reactions have controlling components which are outside of our observable reality, but there clearly is no basis for postulating that the consciousness, judgments, and feelings which are a result of the complex arrangement of these neurons do. This would be a gross misunderstanding of how the brain works.
Forgive me, friend, but your wish is father to your thought, here. Surely you see that the "raw data" you present says nothing, whatsoever, about the ultimate "seat" of human personality? Given two hypothetical people--person A, whose personality is generated utterly by his brain, and person B, whose personhood is made manifest through his brain, how would you know the difference, given only the data you cite? It would fit both explanations. More on that, below.
No one has ever articulated how such a thing could be possible, but I welcome you to try.
I already have, I think. Or, do you mean that no one has ever "explained how a transmission of personality through a brain could be explicable in completely materialist terms"? If so, then that's an instance of fallacious question-begging that really isn't suited for an answer at all.
Not only does this video give a taste of how our brains make us who we are, it shows how particular neurons are even the very seat of our morality.
You've certainly been captivated by the video, anyway! But think critically about what you're saying: I could just as easily say that, because a malfunctioning circuit breaker in my house might render my house without power (quite reliably!), the circuit-breaker must be the ultimate source of electricity for the house. It'd be nonsense.
(Cont'd)
Your argument is for a thing that you claim cannot be detected. Not merely "hasn't been", but "cannot be". This is the hallmark of a false claim. It's the emperor's new clothes; it is the golden plates and seer stone. It's smart to try to make sure the things that you are advocating are impervious to scrutiny, but only if you think they are false. You know that "where scrutiny is possible", things can be resolved to be true or false, and where it isn't, they can't.
As I've said many times before, the fact that the believer puts so much effort into making sure that scrutiny isn't allowed, betrays the believers lack of trust in their own beliefs. I'm not surprised. Believers have been proven wrong by science so many times it's laughable. The only safe place, is in the realm of the the undisprovable.
Reincarnation, Chakras, and many other bogus claims are on the same footing as a soul, and you likely don't accept those, because your criteria for acceptance is arbitrary (extremely low for things you already believe, but higher for things you don't).
You say no difference could be detected between person A and person B. So how would one even arrive at a conclusion that something undetectable controls the brain in the first place? That's coming to a conclusion based on nothing. Saying that the soul is further controlled by the invisible pink unicorn has as much validity. That is to say, none.
You are trying to say that there is some unseen external control of the brain which you think is a only a junction box. I'm simply asking what leads you to this idea? It's obvious that a junction box doesn't produce power, but merely passes it on. This can be observed and explained. On the other hand, a nuclear power plant is a source of power. This also can be observed and explained.
If someone says that a nuclear power plant is really just a junction box, and the power that appears to come from uranium, actually comes from forces in another dimension, we'd both want some explanation for that, right? We wouldn't just accept it without justification (faith).
The explanation that "it cannot be detected, but is nonetheless true" exhibits certainty that is wholly unjustified.
By the way, the position that we must choose between person A and person B is a false choice. If we reject the fact that brains create consciousness, and instead choose to believe there is an undetectable controlling entity, there are an infinite number of possible entities can be imagined. How then, do we choose among these?
Sorry about the delay, Mike; I have two other replies written to you, but I kept getting some random error from Blogger when I tried to post them... and then real life overwhelmed. I'll try to get them posted ASAP, when I have a moment to breathe and surf the web again. (I'm hoping *this* message gets through!)
Finally, a spare few seconds to paste the other two replies that've been collecting dust on my USB drive!
I'll try to get some time to reply to your latest comment, in the next few days.
=====
Dr. Saxes' testing shows quite clearly that morality comes from the brain, that it is subjective, and that moral judgment is something that develops slowly.
Sorry, sir: nonsense, thrice over. No possible "data" could show anything of the sort (and I've read/seen many such presentations), any more than such "empirical data" could disprove the existence of a first cause. If you find the supposition silly, fine: that's your opinion. It's my opinion that your baseline assumptions about "empiricism/materialism explaining every relevant facet of life" to be baseless. But beyond that, even a cursory examination of your account of Dr. Saxe's video leaves many problems.
First: "morality comes from the brain" is almost void of content, when examined; are you seriously proposing that the "wrongness" of child rape comes from the grey matter of the observer, and that it's absolutely relative?
Second: to say that "morality is subjective" is a shade away from uttering complete nonsense; unless you have some general idea of the definition of morality (i.e. what is good, vs. what is evil), you can't simply attribute it all to "merely a matter of opinion/personal view". Otherwise, on what basis would you say that anyone's understanding is "poorly or incompletely developed"? (By whose standards? Yours?)
Third: the fact that moral judgment develops slowly (as I mentioned above) says nothing at all about the objective basis for that morality, any more than a child's slow development of mathematical ability says anything at all about the objective foundation of the multiplication table, or of algebra. (Would you also propose that the truth of the Pythagorean Theorem became "more and more true" as human awareness of the idea clarified?)
We all think of children as "pure", and that their moral sense may get corrupted as they age,
Who, exactly, is this hypothetical "we"? And your statement, "we *all* think" is provably false... because I do not think it, nor does any faithful and well-informed member of the Catholic Church. Look up the doctrine of Original Sin, for more information (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 388ff).
but the contrary is actually true. Children have underdeveloped morals that develop as their brain develops.
Most children do, certainly. But surely you see that this doesn't advance your point in the least? See above, re: "slowly-improving understanding" vs. the necessary externality of the "thing understood" (or else how would anyone "develop" at all, in that regard?).
Neuroscience shows that murderers lack of morality comes directly from brain abnormalities.
It "shows that", does it? (Examine that claim, critically, for a few moments, and you may see how sweeping and unfounded it is; you're seemingly pawning this idea off as "self-evident", and that simply won't do... since it depends squarely on your own atheistic materialism as a foundation, and that's not only unproven, but unprovable.) Are you seriously claiming that all evil done in the world is due to "lack of proper brain formation"? The fact that some types of brain damage do indeed predispose people to do wrong (much like a bent scalpel or misprogrammed radiation gun in an oncology lab could do great damage, despite all good efforts) does not logically imply that all wrongdoing is due to brain damage/malformation. You might just as well (and wrongly) say that, since AIDS causes immune system failure, all immune system failure is attributable to the AIDS (HIV) virus!
It is not, as the ancients thought, the work of a devil of demon acting supernaturally on the immoral, but rather, mundane physical problems.
Oh, come now. Unless you're seriously suggesting that I view all ills of the world to be caused directly by demons (do you seriously hold such a dismissive, condescending, caricature-ridden view of all Christians?)--in which case your ignorance of Catholicism is profound, indeed--then this is simply cheap rhetorical theatre, and you know it.
As for the "extra-temporal cause" line of argument, I know it's difficult to imagine, but nothing can "happen" extra-temporally. If time had a beginning, it can't have a cause. The beginning of time a causation boundry. Cause implies time.
Half a moment, here. You're mixing up the accurate with the erroneous.
First, it's quite true that change (for which time is necessary) implies causation; but that doesn't imply that causation implies change, or time (A -> B does not logically imply B -> A).
Second: you're getting into a bit of a muddle when you speak of "causation" as being necessarily a temporal "event"; "causation", in the sense which I currently use, refers to "that which brings [and yes, the word has temporal baggage] something else into being; a cause is that on which other objects are contingent for existence, if you like (that has less temporal-sounding verbiage). See my last article immediately before your recent two, for details, and see Proposition 2, paragraph 2.
[...] It's not simply that nothing can exist before time, it is that there is no place to exist before time!
You do realize that we're speaking of non-material existence, don't you, when we speak of "spiritual" things? "Spiritual" isn't merely on a "higher" dimension (such as the 5th or 7th); it's beyond all physical dimensions entirely (including the 4th, which we experience as "time", and through which we travel--usually--in one direction).
Now let's go back to our 2 dimensional world. We can imagine a god that lived outside of our observable reality, in that unseen 3rd dimension,
Again: there's the error. God's Divine Nature is, as the Church understands Him (and as the "Uncaused Cause" idea posits), beyond all material dimensions; he's not simply "one or two steps above us", dimensionally speaking.
If there is a place or time for a god to exist outside of our space time, we would then have the problem of how that place or time came into existence.
The very notions of "place" and "time" for God's existence (save as loose metaphors for us humans, when we speak of Heaven) have no meaning; God, being above all materiality, occupies no "place" or "time", but transcends both. He simply "Is".
Either time and the universe always existed, or time began uncaused.
Now, above and beyond the aforementioned (and other) problems, think that through: how, exactly, would time "begin" uncaused? How can a nonexistent thing give itself existence? The very idea is absurd... and even if we allow your axioms (for the sake of argument), it doesn't follow.
Oy, vey.
Mike, look: I'll pass over your self-congratulatory and smug-sounding tone (and rather ignorant diatribes against theists, and against Christians in particular), if you'll agree to go back with me and solidify some terms. Before you started theist-bashing, you had some cogent questions/objections:
From October 19, 2009 10:54 AM:
The concept of a "Cause" has no meaning outside of time.
I disagree that the word "cause" needs to be meaningless (since "cause" can also mean "that on which an object's existence is immediately contingent", which has no temporal-sounding baggage in its verbiage--but it's awfully cumbersome and clunky). If it helps: for my purposes (and I didn't invent this, mind you), "bases of contingency" may include temporality-laden causes (such as we know in cause-effect links), but it also includes eternal "contingencies", as well.
If time had a beginning, it makes no more sense to posit a "cause" for it's beginning, as it does to ask "what is north of the north pole?".
Yes, it does... but only if the cause is of a different order of being than is the "beginning" being examined. The "beginning of time" cannot have been caused by time itself (or some subset), but by something which transcends time. The existence of latitudes less than or equal to 90 degrees N cannot have been caused by a latitude greater than 90 degrees north, nor by any latitude of any sort; it must have a cause which transcends latitude altogether. Nowhere did I say that the uncaused cause was temporal; in fact, I insisted on the exact opposite (see Proposition #6). You assert that the "causing" is meaningless without time, which is false (when speaking of ontological causation), and I addressed that already (also see: October 27, 2009 7:48 AM)
This is above and beyond the rather serious fact that "things with beginnings" must have had something to begin them, since they cannot "begin" (i.e. cause) themselves. I'm not sure how you can keep speaking so blithely about time "having a beginning" without recognizing the need for something outside of time to have begun it!
Now: perhaps we can settle all differences on these initial points, before we thrash out the subsequent points which largely depend on them?
Hi Paladin (Brian?), this is Jack from Jill Stanek's blog. Sorry I never continued our discussion there. I was in a bad place, and I have found it better for me not to discuss religion when I am feeling like that. I usually just end up making people mad. ;) Not very productive.
So, for your existence argument. Let me first say well done. You obviously put a good deal of study into it. I really can't find any gaping holes or anything; to my uneducated eye it looks pretty sound. I had one minor quibble, with the fact that multiple uncaused causes must necessarily be the same. Say you have two identical twins, exact same DNA, exact same development, exact same everything (I know it doesn't happen like that, but it's just a thought experiment). Wouldn't they still be distinct "objects", rather than identical? I may just not be thinking deeply enough or understanding, but it doesn't seem to follow that there cannot be more than one uncaused cause, even if they are identical.
But yeah, reading this solidified that growing thought I was having that agnosticism isn't a justifiable position, so there's that at least. :)
Hi, Jack!
Do you have an e-mail address, perchance? You can find mine on my blog page by clicking on "full profile", so you could send it to me that way, if you're game; I've an e-mail to send you! :)
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